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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
JURISDICTION-THE SHORT-LIVED DEATH OF THE Ker-Frisbie
DOCTRINE

I.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly ninety years the doctrine that a court may not question the manner by which a criminal defendant is brought within
its territorial jurisdiction stood immutable. The Supreme Court
first espoused the doctrine in Ker v. Illinois' in 1886 and reaffirmed
the rule in Frisbie v. Collins2 in 1952. In United States v.
Toscanino,3 decided in 1974, the virtually unquestioned KerFrisbiedoctrine was successfully challenged for the first time. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that modern liberal due
process standards conflict with the conservative view of due process expressed by the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and that Ker-Frisbie
must yield. At its broadest, Toscanino held that due process vitiates personal jurisdiction of federal courts over defendants forcibly abducted from abroad by United States agents. The Toscanino
inroad into the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine has prompted very active litigation in the area of criminal jurisdiction gained by forcible abduction. Federal courts have interpreted, weakened, limited, and finally emasculated the Toscanino holding in a series of recent cases.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Ker-FrisbieDoctrine
1. Ker v. Illinois.-The Supreme Court first proclaimed the
doctrine that a court may not question the manner by which a
defendant is brought into its territorial jurisdiction in Ker v.
Illinois.4 Defendant claimed that because of his forcible abduction
from Peru by a United States agent,5 due process barred his prose1.
2.

119 U.S. 436 (1886).
342 U.S. 519 (1952).

3. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
4.
5.

119 U.S. 436 (1886).
The agent was a presidential messenger carrying a request for extradition.

The Peruvian government was unable to receive the request owing to current

military circumstances in that country. Consequently, the agent abducted Ker
and brought him to California. The Governor of California had received extradition papers from Illinois before Ker's arrival, and defendant was sent almost
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cution. The Court, however, reasoned that due process requirements are met when a defendant is "regularly indicted by the
proper grand jury in the State Court, has a trial according to the
forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when, in that trial
and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he is lawfully
entitled. ' ' The Court speculated that some pre-trial events would
be barred by the fourteenth amendment,7 but that "mere irregularities" in the manner in which the court gained jurisdiction do not
constitute grounds for denying trial when defendant has been
charged in a regular indictment! The Court also rejected defendant's claim that the United States extradition treaty with Peru
gave him a positive right to be removed from Peru only in accordance with that treaty.'
2. Frisbie v. Collins.-The Supreme Court revitalized Ker in

Frisbiev. Collins,'" ruling that "this Court has never departed from
the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois that the power of a court to
try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction'."" Petitioner, seeking a writ of habeas corpus, argued that
his forcible abduction" into the trial court's jurisdiction and subsequent trial and conviction violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the Federal Kidnapping Act.' 3 The
immediately to Illinois. 119 U.S. at 438-39. See Fairman, Ker v. IllinoisRevisited,
47 Am.J. INT'L L. 678, 685 (1953).
6. 119 U.S. at 440.
7. Since Ker involved a state prosecution, defendant's claim rested on the
fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment was only twenty years old at
the time, and the concept of substantive due process so new that the Court was
obliged to enclose it in quotation marks: "the 'due process of law' here guaranteed
is complied with. . .

."

119 U.S. at 440.

8. 119 U.S. at 440. The Court indicated that a person "may be arrested for
a very heinous offense without any warrant, or without any previous complaint,
and brought before a proper officer, and this may in some sense be said to be
'without due process of law'."
9. The Court reasoned that an extradition treaty regulates only the procedure by which one country makes demands on another for return of a fugitive,
and that in the instant case the treaty was never invoked and thus could not be
violated. 119 U.S. at 442-43.
10. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
11. 342 U.S. at 522.
12. Petitioner had alleged that Michigan authorities forcibly seized, handcuffed, and blackjacked him in Chicago and then took him across state lines to
Michigan. 342 U.S. at 520.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970). The statute provides in relevant part: "Whoever
knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who has been
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Court held that the added allegation of violation of the Federal
Kidnapping Act did not constitute grounds for overruling the Ker
precedent.'"
B. Due Process Developments Subsequent to Frisbieand
Application of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Through 1973
The double-standard that would confront the Toscanino court
twenty years later began in 1952 with two seemingly inconsistent
holdings. In Rochin v. California,'"rendered two months prior to
Frisbie, the Supreme Court condemned as "conduct that shocks
the conscience"'" a search conducted by forcibly extracting the
contents of a suspect's stomach, and held that the subsequent
conviction based on evidence from that search had been obtained
by methods which violate the due process clause. Thus, in the
same term the Supreme Court upheld the conservative Ker rule in
Frisbie,but concurrently liberalized substantive due process standards in Rochin. What has been called the "due process revolution" 7 sprang directly from Rochin and has resulted in broad guarantees of specific pre-trial rights.'" Concurrent with the development of modern due process the Ker-Frisbie doctrine stood firm
and led one court to declare: "Absent a treaty or law which limits
jurisdiction, a court may try a defendant for any crime for which
he has been properly indicted. And the means by which a defendant is brought before the court are immaterial whether he was
kidnapped by American agents in flagrant violation of another
state's sovereignty, or handed over by foreign agents who had not
unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried
away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise ... shall be punished ......
14. The Court held that the "act cannot fairly be construed so as to add to
the list of sanctions detailed a sanction barring a state from prosecuting persons
wrongfully brought to it by its officers." 342 U.S. at 523.
15. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

16. 342 U.S. at 172.
17.

Erwin N. Griswold expressed the opinion that during the past twenty

years a constitutional revolution has occurred. The heart of the revolution, he
declared, is the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Griswold, The
Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 712 (1971).
18. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (information obtained dur-

ing course of an interview excluded where defendant held not to have made a
knowing waiver of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination; Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment confrontation clause binds states
through fourteenth amendment).
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complied with the extradition treaty."' 9
Violations of guaranteed specific pre-trial rights are remedied by
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence-the "fruit of the poisonous tree;"2 this exclusionary rule has been deemed the sole practical remedy for pre-trial due process violations.2 ' Yet, in instances
of admitted unlawful arrest by entrapment or kidnapping, when
the trial itself might have been characterized as a "fruit" of government illegality, courts have ruled that the due process violation
is cured by proper indictment prior to trial. 22 In United States v.
Russell, however, the Supreme Court indicated by way of dicta,
that in some instances denial of jurisdiction might be the only
proper remedy to entrapment.2
In sum, despite Rochin, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine has been applied to both state and federal prosecutions indiscriminately 4 and
to a variety of factual circumstances.2 Although the doctrine was
19. Fiocconi v. Attorney General, 339 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(emphasis added).
20. See generally Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. C0iM. L.C. & P.S. 307 (1964);
Pitler, "The Fruitof the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL. L.
REV. 579 (1968); Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant
Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136 (1967).

21.

See generally Edwards, Criminal Liability for UnreasonableSearches

and Seizures, 41 VA. L. REV. 621 (1955); Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation:A
Proposalfor Improving Police Performance, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 1123 (1967).
22. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972) (defendant's illegal arrest
irrelevant, since no evidence obtained by the fourth amendment violation was
introduced at trial). Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (connection between defendant's unlawful arrest and his statement offered as evidence
so attenuated as to dissipate the taint).
23. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). "We may some day be
presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction." 411 U.S. at 431-32. The Court's
standard of "outrageous" conduct flows directly from Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) ("conduct that shocks the conscience" violates due process).
24. Both Ker and Frisbiewere state prosecutions, yet no distinction has been
drawn between fifth amendment and fourteenth amendment due process rights
in the area of forcible abduction. For example, in United States v. Sobell, 244
F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957), a federal case, the court summarily rejected defendant's
claim that fifth amendment due process barred his prosecution because he had
been brought to trial by way of forcible abduction from Mexico: "We think the
question presented is indistinguishable from . . .Ker and that our decision here
is controlled by that case." 242 F.2d at 525.
25. One commentator has listed the variety of federal cases that are controlled by the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine-ranging from illegal arrest to violation by one
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criticized occasionally,2 8 it remained resolutely upheld through
1973.
C.

Toscanino: A Victory for Due Process

Toscanino v. United States" presented the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals with harsh circumstances akin to those faced by the
Supreme Court in Rochin. Defendant alleged that he was lured
from his home in Montevideo by a Uruguayan policeman in the
pay of United States agents and abducted by the policeman and
six associates by being knocked unconscious and thrown into the
rear seat of a car. Defendant claimed he was bound, blindfolded,
driven to the Brazilian border, and there taken into custody by
Brazilian authorities under the direction of the United States. Toscanino further alleged that he was held incommunicado for seventeen days, and was, moreover, brutalized, tortured, and interrogated while reports from the interrogation were forwarded to the
office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York. Defendant finally alleged that he was drugged and flown to
New York where he was arrested aboard the plane and taken immediately to the office of the United States Attorney.3 After conviction for narcotics violations, 9 defendant sought remand for an
evidentiary hearing on whether the court below had obtained personal jurisdiction improperly. Defendant claimed his abduction
violated two international treaties 3 and the laws of three sovereign
foreign country of the sovereignty of another at the behest of the United States.
Comment, 43 FORD. L. REV. 634, 635, n.7 (1975).
26. In United States v. Edmonds, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970), a case involving evidence obtained incident to an illegal arrest, the Second Circuit said that
Frisbieand Ker "rested only on general considerations of due process" and speculated, "whether the Court would now adhere to them must be regarded as questionable." 432 F.2d 577, 583. See also United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1973) (adhering to Ker and Frisbiein affirming lower court conviction where
defendants had been forcibly abducted from Viet Nam, but questioning the vital-

ity of the doctrine); Government of Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir.
1970) (lower court's finding that defendant entered territorial jurisdiction voluntarily not clearly erroneous).
27. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). For analysis of the case see Comments, 43

FORD. L. Rav. 634 (1975); 88

HARV.

L. REv. 813 (1975); 10 TULSA L.J. 479 (1975).

28. 500 F.2d at 269-70.
29. Defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 173-74 (1970) for conspiracy
to import and distribute narcotics. Defendant did not appeal the substantive

conviction.
30. The Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization
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states,3 ' and that due process principles barred the court from

asserting jurisdiction obtained by such methods.
The Second Circuit assumed the truth of Toscanino's allegations
for the purpose of appeal; reversed and remanded for an eviden-

tiary hearing; and held that such governmental illegality and invasion of defendant's civil rights, if proved, would violate due process
principles, divest the lower court of jurisdiction, and require that
the defendant be returned to his status quo ante.2 To reach this

conclusion, the court first outlined the Ker-Frisbie doctrine 3
against the development of modern due process.3 The Court reasoned that Frisbiehad been subjected to almost immediate erosion
by the Supreme Court's decision in Rochin just two months prior
to Frisbie.The Court noted that Mapp v. Ohio31 further weakened
Frisbie, since it stood for greater liberalization of the due process
clause.36 The court opined that underlying the assertion of the
exclusionary rule in Mapp was the liberal philosophy of Justice
Brandeis that the government should be held to the same stanof American States have both been signed by the United States and Uruguay.
U.N. Charter art. 2, Para. 4 provides in part: "All members shall refrain ... from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state ...

."; Organization

of American States Charter art. 17 provides in

part: "The territory of any state is inviolable, it may not be the object, even
temporarily ...

of ...

measures taken by another state directly or indirectly,

on any grounds whatsoever ......
31. The Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970), federal wiretap
statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq. (1970), and similar provisions of Uruguayan
and Brazilian law.
32. As to the wiretap allegation, the Court held the fourth amendment prohibits the government from conducting illegal electronic surveillance abroad and
that the government is required to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970) when it
is invoked by an alien alleging wiretap abroad (under above statute government
required upon motion to admit or deny occurrence of an unlawful act in form of
eavesdropping or surveillance).

33. Under Ker-Frisbie,the court concluded, "due process was limited to the
guarantee of a constitutionally fair trial, regardless of the method by which jurisdiction was obtained over the defendant." 500 F.2d at 272.

34. The court found that due process presently stands for more than the
guarantee of fair procedure at trial, that the term "has been extended to bar the
government from realizing directly the fruits of its own deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness in bringing the accused to trial." 500 F.2d at 272. The court cited
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), among others, to reach this conclusion.

35. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36. Mapp held the exclusionary rule binding on states through the fourteenth
amendment. 367 U.S. at 655.
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dards of conduct as individual citizens. 7 The court found that
"[t]he Supreme Court's decisions in Rochin and Mapp unmistakably contradict its pronouncement in Frisbie."8 The court next
examined recent decisions in other circuits and found further evidence of the doctrine's weakness. 9 Faced with an irreconcilable
conflict between the restricted version of due process espoused by
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and the unconfined reasoning of Rochin
and Mapp, the court held that Ker-Frisbiemust yield to the modem doctrine.
The court noted that the exclusionary rule generally sanctions
governmental pre-trial illegality, but that the Supreme Court has
indicated that absolute denial of personal jurisdiction could be an
appropriate alternative in extreme circumstances." Finding
Toscanino to be such a case, the court ruled that:
having unlawfully seized the defendant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment 4' . ..the government should as a matter of fundamental fairness be obligated to return him to his status quo ante....
Accordingly, we view due process as now requiring a court to divest
itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been
acquired as the result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary
2
and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights.
The court reasoned that its decision conflicted with the general
doctrine of Ker-Frisbie, but that both Ker and Frisbiewere state
37. In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928), Justice Brandeis said:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizens .... If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt

for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means-to declare that the government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set
its face. 277 U.S. at 485.
38. 500 F.2d at 274.
39. United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973); Virgin Islands v.
Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1970).
40. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
41. One commentator feels that it is unclear exactly what right was violated
by the defendant's abduction from Uruguay. 88 HARv.L. REv. 814, n.9 (1975).
42. 500 F.2d at 275. The court added that its conclusion was but an extension
of the federal court's power to decline to exercise civil jurisdiction when a defendant's presence had been obtained by force or fraud.
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court cases, not strictly binding on review of a federal decision' 3
Finally, the court distinguished the instant decision from Ker and
Frisbie on the ground that in neither of those cases had defendant
alleged violation of international conventions."

Ill.

RECENT DECISIONS

Toscanino appeared to promise a new step in the development
of due process-United States agents operating abroad would be
held to fourth amendment standards-but almost immediately,
federal court opinions began to rapidly erode the due process rights
that Toscanino had seemingly afforded to defendants brought
within a court's territorial jurisdiction as victims of a forcible abduction by governmental agents.
A.

United States v. Miller

The first post-Toscanino abduction case arose in United States
5 in the Southern District of Florida, when defendant
v. Miller"
moved to dismiss his indictment on the ground that Toscanino was
applicable. 4"Though the decision is unclear, defendant apparently alleged that he had been illegally abducted by a bondsman
and returned to the United States from Jamaica. The district court
interpreted Toscanino to hold that the federal criminal process is
abused when a defendant is brought into the United States by an
illegal abduction from another country, but noted that the Second

Circuit's decision hinged on the illegality of method used by the
43. As a further justification the Court opined that it could use its supervisory powers to remedy abuse of the district court process. See Hogan & Snee, The
McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 29 (1952).
Use of this power would not have required a finding that defendant's constitutional rights had been violated. Comment, 43 FORD. L. REv. 634, 645-46 (1975).
44. The weakness of this aspect of the Toscanino holding is criticized in
detail in 88 HARV, L. REv. 813, 820-23 (1975). Generally individuals lack standing
to assert a breach of international law. See, e.g., Sei Fuju v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718,
242 P.2d 617 (1952) (treaty obligation asserted held not to be self-executing and
therefore not a part of United States municipal law that plaintiff could invoke).
See Note, The Nature and Extent of Executive Power to Espouse the International Claims of United States Nationals, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95, 95-6
(1973).
45. 384 F. Supp. 56 (S.D. Fla. 1974). Miller was handed down slightly less
than six months after Toscanino. The federal statutes are not specified in this
opinion. Since Herrera relies on Toscanino it is probably safe to assume the
federal statutes allegedly violated are the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1201 (1970), and similar statutes under Peruvian law.
46. 384 F. Supp. at 56.
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United States government to obtain jurisdiction. 7 The court found
that the stipulated facts clearly showed Miller had been lawfully
arrested in Jamaica and lawfully deported by Jamaican authorities. Since the method used to gain jurisdiction over Miller was
legal, the court found no need to relinquish jurisdiction and denied
dismissal of the indictment. The Miller court, however, implicitly
upheld Toscanino.
B.

United States v. Herrera

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first faced the Toscanino
decision in United States v. Herrera." Defendant had escaped
from federal prison and fled to Bogota, Colombia. He later was
recaptured in Peru by United States and Peruvian agents. Defendant was illegally detained in Peru for five days and then put on a
plane in Lima and flown to Miami. Herrera, citing Toscanino,
argued that the district court was divested of jurisdiction49 because
his forcible abduction and delivery to Miami contravened federal
statutes," the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States, and violated due process standards. The court of appeals rejected defendant's argument and
cited Ker, Frisbie, and several of its own previous holdings. The
court briefly considered Toscanino without discussion of due process and indicated that the instant case was distinguishable since
Herrera had not alleged torture or electronic surveillance at the
direction of United States officials. 51 Apparently, the court would
have limited Toscanino to the Rochin "conduct that shocks the
conscience" rationale.
47. 384 F. Supp. at 56.
48. 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974). Herrerawas handed down in December 1974
about seven months after the Toscanino decision.
49. 504 F.2d at 860. Defendant also argued that failure to follow the extradition process provided by the treaty between Peru and the United States should
divest the district court of jurisdiction.

50. 504 F.2d at 860.
51. 504 F.2d at 860. The Fifth Circuit reiterates its position assumed in
Herrerain two subsequent decisions. In both United States v. Winters, 509 F.2d
975 (5th Cir. 1975) (neither U.S. residents nor non-resident aliens may challenge
district court jurisdiction on grounds that arrest by Coast Guard unlawful), and
United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant's argument
that alleged forcible abduction from Venezuela in violation of Federal Kidnapping Act, treaty between the United States and Venezuela, and the Charter of

the United Nations constituted due process and fourth amendment violations
lacks merit), the court rejected contentions that forcible abduction by
government agents violate due process.
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C. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler
A month after Herrera,the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had
an opportunity to review its Toscanino holding in United States ex

rel, Lujan v. Gengler.52 Lujan was lured from Argentina into Bolivia53 and taken into custody by Bolivian police who were acting
as paid agents of the United States. Bolivian police then held
defendant incommunicado for five days before placing him on a
plane to New York. Upon his arrival in New York City, federal
agents formally arrested defendant." Lujan's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was dismissed without hearing by the district
5 6 The Second
court,55 and he appealed on the basis of Toscanino.
Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial of the writ and held that
the government's conduct towards Lujan was not so egregious as
to violate due process. In its opinion the court said that its Toscanino decision had merely revoked the carte blanche powers government agents had enjoyed under Ker-Frisbie. Its decision in
Toscanino was said to disallow the abduction of defendants to the
United States when accompanied by torture and brutality, but was
not meant to imply that a "mere irregularity" 57 in the circumstances surrounding a defendant's arrival in the jurisdiction should
preclude criminal proceedings." The court noted that the cases
on which it had relied in Toscanino when it carved its exception
to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine involved shocking and outrageous
government conduct, and that Toscanino stood for denial of
jurisdiction only in cases where government conduct was outrageous. Once the court established this interpretation of Toscanino, it distinguished Lujan on the grounds that the conduct surrounding Lujan was not egregious-that, in fact, Lujan charged
no deprivation greater than he would have endured through
52.

510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).

53. Defendant, a licensed pilot, was hired by one Duran to fly him to Bolivia.
Duran, employed by American agents, had told Lujan he needed to fly to Bolivia
to conduct some mining business. 510 F.2d at 63.
54. 510 F.2d at 63. Defendant had never been formally charged in Bolivia.
The United States had also made no request for extradition.
55. See 510 F.2d at 64.
56. 510 F.2d at 63.
57. The court's use of "irregularity" is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's
language in Ker when it said that "mere irregularities" do not constitute grounds
for denying prosecution of a defendant. 119 U.S. at 440.

58. 510 F.2d at 65.
59. 510 F.2d at 66.
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extradition.59 The court rejected Lujan's contention that his abduction constituted a violation of the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States" and thus found
Lujan distinguishable from Toscanino on this ground also.'
IV.

THE REMNANTS OF ToSCANINO

The recent decisions outlined above have again reshaped the law
after the Toscanino decision's bold intrusion into the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine. Toscanino on its face had extended due process rights to
non-resident aliens and directly opposed the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine;
that relatively recent formulation has rapidly deteriorated. The
district court in Miller implicitly accepted Toscanino when it interpreted Toscanino to mean that jurisdiction should be denied
whenever a defendant has been brought into the United States by
an illegal abduction from a foreign country. 2 The court implied
that any showing of illegality of method" would have led the court
to an opposite conclusion. Thus as first interpreted in Miller,
Toscanino did not require allegations of brutality and torture.64
The Fifth Circuit's holding in Herrera, however, began the revival of Ker-Frisbie.Not only did the court reject outright the idea
that an abducted non-resident alien had prejurisdictional due process rights, 5 but the court by way of dicta distinguished the facts
of Herrerafrom those of Toscanino on the basis of brutality. The
60.

See note 29 supra.

61. The court found that Lujan had not alleged a protest by Bolivia, whereas
Toscanino had alleged a protest by Uruguay. The court held allegation of a
protest necessary to assert a treaty violation. In light of the fact that neither
Toscanino nor Lujan had standing to raise international treaty violations, see
note 44 supra, the distinction made by the court is not well-founded.
62. 384 F. Supp. at 56.
63. I.e. kidnap or forcible abduction.
64. These two elements may be used to distinguish Toscanino from most
abduction cases and would severely limit the holding. Thus, since Miller does not
require such allegations, its interpretation of Toscanino leaves Toscanino at its
broadest.
65. The court adhered to the Ker-Frisbie-doctrine and so perpetuated the
notion that due process can be violated only after a defendant is within the
jurisdiction of the court.
66. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Herrera from Toscanino unnecessarily
since its holding rested on adherence to Ker-Frisbie.It distinguished Herreraon
the grounds that Herrera had not alleged torture or electronic surveillance at the
direction of United States officials. The Second Circuit subsequently made the
same distinction to support its stance in Lujan. United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (1975). Judge Anderson's concurring opinion in Lujan
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failure of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to give serious consideration to Toscanino dealt a serious blow to broad due process
rights for aliens in that circuit and probably influenced the strict
limitations that the Second Circuit subsequently imposed on its
own holding.
In Lujan the Second Circuit Court of Appeals based its opinion
on forced reasoning, attempted to distinguish Toscanino, and severely limited the due process rights enunciated in Toscanino. It
relied on Rochin and Russell and concluded that Toscanino was
decided on the basis of conduct which "offends those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English
speaking people," "shocks the conscience," and "offends a 'sense
of justice'."6 The court claimed that it did not intend to suggest
in Toscanino that any "irregularity"" in the circumstances of a
defendant's arrival should vitiate its jurisdiction. Thus, the court
ignored its own explicit statement in Toscanino that "we view due
process as now requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over
the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result

of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights."

9

In deciding that

due process is violated only by "outrageous and reprehensible"
conduct, the Lujan court simply adopted the reasoning of Judge
Anderson's concurring opinion in Toscanino. There, Judge Anderson had said: "My concurrence is so limited because this case can
be disposed of on due process grounds alone. Rochin v. California
. . '70 In citing Rochin it is clear that Judge Anderson had advomakes explicit reference to Herrera. 510 F.2d at 69.
67. 510 F.2d at 65.
68. See note 57 supra. One commentator has indicated that Toscanino could
have been decided on this ground alone due to the brutality and torture surrounding the abduction. "Ker and Frisbie reflect a judgment not that due process is
limited to the guarantee of a fair trial, but that interstate or international abduction is not misconduct sufficiently egregious to justify releasing the defendant."
88 HARV. L. REV. 813, 816 (1975). The fact remains, however, that the Second
Circuit chose to oppose Ker-Frisbie.
69. 500 F.2d at 275. Additionally, the Toscanino court twice analogized its
new due process position to the refusal of a court to exercise jurisdiction over civil
defendant whose presence had been secured by force or fraud. 500 F.2d at 27576.
70. 500 F.2d at 281. Judge Anderson's concurring opinion neatly allows the
same outcome as that of the majority. It is clear from his lone citation to Rochin
that he considered the governmental conduct in Toscanino to fall within the
conscience shocking standard set by Rochin. Since Judge Anderson's opinion is
founded upon the Rochin standard it is apparent that the majority's opinion was
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cated an "outrageous conduct" standard rather than the broad test
put forth by the majority. Despite the lack of sound reasoning in
the court's secondhand interpretation of Toscanino,7' Lujan now
stands for the proposition that a court's jurisdiction is vitiated only
when governmental conduct moves beyond that which is "simply
illegal" into conduct that "sinks to a violation of due process" by
72

Rochin standards.

V.

CONCLUSION

Why the Second Circuit Court of Appeals chose to retreat from
its Toscanino holding is unclear. The drastic nature of the remedy 3
afforded by Toscanino to any defendant illegally abducted has
been criticized as too inflexible. 74 On the other hand, the Lujan
rule allows the remedy only in the limited circumstances of egreintended to encompass a broader standard. The Lujan court's claim that the
Toscanino decision rested on the conscience shocking standard, therefore, would
seem to be misplaced.
71. See note 61 supra.
72. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated Lujan in United States
v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975), where the court upheld the district court's
evidentiary finding that, although the defendant may have been tortured after
his abduction by Chilean authorities, there was no proof that agents of the United
States participated in or had knowledge of such torture. The court held that
Toscanino requires proof of egregious conduct on the part of United States agents
and absent such proof Toscanino is inapplicable. The Lira decision indicates the
Second Circuit would not hesitate to again release a defendant if egregious United
States governmental conduct could be proven, but the burden placed upon an
incarcerated defendant to prove such conduct abroad is heayy indeed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals felt Lujan made it clear that the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals will continue to follow Ker-Frisbie;except where grossly
cruel and unusual barbarities are demonstrated. United States v. Lovato, 520
F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant found to have been expelled and not
forcibly abducted so not necessary to consider Toscanino).
In addition the Eastern District Court of Illinois interpreted Toscanino and

Lujan in the case of In re David, 390 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ill. 1975). Defendant,
prior to his extradition hearing, sought an order to compel answers to interrogatories and claimed he had been forcibly abducted into the United States. The court
held that the allegations, even if true, would not divest the court of jurisdiction
to determine whether the defendant should be returned to France to stand trial
on a pending criminal charge. The court added as dicta that Lujan left no doubt
that Toscanino applied only to situations where the defendant was the victim of
egregious governmental conduct.
3. Le. refusal to accept jurisdiction over the defendant.
74. See Comment, 43 FORD. L. REV. at 646-47 (1975); 88 HARV. L. REv. 813,
816-20 (1975).
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gious conduct. The problem remains to determine what remedy,
if any, should be available to victims who are subjected to illegal
but not outrageous governmental conduct.
The government has vigorously argued that federal narcotics law
enforcement depends upon the freedom of officers to abduct suspects, particularly from South American countries that apparently
do not object to the practice." Additionally, outdated extradition
treaties do not provide for drug offenses 7 so that broad adherence
to Toscanino would allow de facto asylum to suspected offenders.
In short, the government would excuse its own unlawful acts of
kidnapping on the grounds that the end result is justifiable. 77 However, this argument completely abnegates the moral and ethical
considerations that underlie due process philosophy. 8 In extending
due process rights to alien kidnap victims, the judiciary system
does no more than support and affirm the United States claim to
regional 7l and world" moral leadership. Principally at the insis75. United States Petition for Rehearing at 6, United States v. Toscanino,
500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). Abduction seems to be a general practice to which
Latin American nations have never protested.
76. At present, it does not appear that any bilateral treaties with South
American nations specifically provide for drug offenses. Recently, the United
States has sought specifically to include drug offenses in its extradition treaties.
A 1972 treaty with Denmark grants extradition for "an offense against the laws
relating to narcotic drugs, cannabis sativa L, psychotropic drugs and chemicals."
Treaty with Denmark on Extradition, June 22, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 7864. But even
a provision for extradition for drug offenses may not deter illicit methods of
obtaining jurisdiction. See, Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and IrregularRendition
Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 63-4 (1973).
77. Ironically, the United States has strongly criticized the use of such tactics by other organizations. See The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism:A
Global Approach, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 274 (1974) (deploring "the virtual epidemic of kidnappings in Latin America"). Evidently, when the end (i.e. terrorism) is considered deplorable, the means become deplorable, too.
78. It has been argued that the wisdom of the remedy proposed in Toscanino,
i.e. vitiation of jurisdiction, depends on a resolution of the practical questions of
pervasiveness of the illegal conduct, whether or not the remedy will effectively
promote respect for the law, and whether there are practical alternative means
for deterring the governmental misconduct. 88 HARV. L. REv. 813, 818 (1975). The

author concludes that the Toscanino remedy is not necessary in light of these
considerations. 88 HARV. L. REV. 813, 817 (1975).
79. Although the United States adamantly maintains that it is the dominant
moral force in the hemisphere, there are indications that less than forceful stances
have been assumed by the United States in some areas. The Organization of
American States created the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights in
1960 (for statute of the Commission see O.A.S. Doc. OE/Ser.LN/11.26, Doc. 10,
at 1-6 (1972), but it has so far proved ineffective. The United States has not yet
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tence of the United States,8 1 human rights provisions were included in the United Nations Charter, 2 and the International Declaration of Human Rights was promulgated.83 Maintenance of a
judiciary system dedicated to protection of human rights is essential to a nation whose foundation rests on respect for the individ-

ual. The remedy afforded by Toscanino to any victim of governmental illegality by way of forcible abduction redresses the wrong
to the individual and should be retained.
C. Jedson Nau
ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, 36 O.A.S.T.S. 1
(1969). For general discussion, see Fox, The Protection of Human Rights in the
Americas, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 222 (1968); Cabranes, The Protection of
Human Rights by the Organization of American States, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 889
(1968); Scheman, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 59 Am. J. INT'L
L. 335 (1965).
80. For an indication of how the United States views itself in terms of moral
standing see generally Hearingon the InternationalProtection of Human Rights
before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the
House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and the subsequent
report issued by the Committee, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMmUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP.

81.

Henkin, The United States and the Crisis in Human Rights, 14 VA. J.
653, 653-64 (1974).
82. All members of the United Nations are obligated "to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of...
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
....
" U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56
c. For discussion of the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter see Bassiouni, note 79 supra, at 52-4.
83. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). Article 5 provides in part:

INT'L L.

"No one shall be subjected to torture . . . ." Article 9 provides: "No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest . . . ." Article 12 provides: "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy . . . ." To this date the

United States has not become a party to the various United Nations Covenants

on human rights. See generally Humphrey, The UniversalDeclarationof Human

Rights, 4 INT'L J. 351 (1949); Lauterpacht, The Universal Declarationof Human
Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B.

INT'L L.

354 (1948).

